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1 Introduction
More than thirty years ago, John Harsanyi noted that “apart from economic payoffs, social
status seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”
(Harsanyi, 1980). At least since then, economists have tried to incorporate the incentives
arising from status into their formal models. A branch of the literature uses signaling theory
to capture notions of status and esteem concerns.1 In these models, each agent is character-
ized by an unobservable attribute (ability, wealth, altruism) and is concerned about society’s
perception of his attribute. When he decides to adopt or not a particular behavior (study
towards a degree, buy an expensive car, donate to charity), he takes into account the gain
or loss in esteem – measured by the change in society’s perception – associated with that
behavior. This literature has proved successful in explaining a range of empirical phenomena
(see Ellingsen and Johanneson, 2007). However, little attention has been devoted to under-
standing if and how the characteristics of one’s peers affect the incentives to engage in costly
signaling.2 This is what we wish to do in this paper.
The underlying idea is very simple. Belonging to a particular group (school, firm, frater-
nity, sport club, academic institution) conveys information about one’s own characteristics
(wealth, ability, social skills). This is because different groups typically carry different dis-
tributions of relevant attributes among their members. For instance, job market candidates
from prestigious academic institutions are automatically accorded higher expected ability
than candidates from second tier institutions. As noted by Charles et al. (2009), this opens
the door to the possibility that identical individuals who happen to belong to different groups
may face different pressure to engage in status-enhancing signaling.
1Examples include Bernheim (1994), Ireland, (1994), Glazer and Konrad (1996), Corneo and Gruener
(2000), Be´nabou and Tirole (2006 and 2011), Ellingsen and Johanneson (2008), Andreoni and Bernheim
(2009), Harbaugh (2010).
2Economic theories of peer effects are based on complementarities in production (see e.g. Arnott and
Rowse, 1987, Be´nabou, 1993, Lazear, 2001), and on information externalities (Banerjee and Beasley, 1991).
There is also work that looks at peer pressure and peer monitoring in team production (Kandel and Lazear,
1992, Barron and Gjerde, 1997). Another strand of the literature – see e.g., Adriani and Sonderegger (2009,
2018) and Adriani et al. (2018) – builds on the idea that, through parental socialization choices a` la Bisin
and Verdier (2001), the distribution of traits in the population and peer pressure to conform to social norms
are jointly determined. None of these elements is present in our model.
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In this paper, we look at this problem from the perspective of the “honor-stigma” model
proposed by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006, 2011). This model is extremely simple and yet, we
argue, generates a rich set of predictions. The primary reason for the model’s simplicity is
that, differently from other signaling models of status, agents can only signal their attributes
by performing or not a discrete task. The discrete nature of the action space implies that
information conveyed by one’s behavior is coarse, ensuring that some degree of pooling
always occurs in equilibrium. This provides a natural channel for the shape of the peer group
distribution to affect signaling incentives and differentiates the setting from environments
with continuous actions, where full separation is possible.3 Another advantage is that these
non-convexities map salient features of real world problems in a compelling way. For instance,
educational attainments are typically discrete in nature and are marked by events (e.g.
graduation ceremonies) that emphasize their discreteness. Similarly, status symbols (luxury
watches, bespoke suits, sports cars) are typically coarse signals of one’s wealth. Indeed, it is
precisely their potential as “pooling devices” that makes these goods attractive to many.
We add to existing literature by providing a systematic analysis of the comparative statics
of the “honor-stigma” model, which enables us to derive novel results. We use the model to
ask the following questions: What is the effect of belonging to a “better” (smarter, richer,
more pro-social) group on the incentive to engage in costly signaling? What is the effect of
a more diverse group? What is the effect of segregation by ability (e.g. admissions policies
to academic programmes)? What happens when the upper tail self selects out of the group?
Our first result focuses on how the signaling incentives are affected by a shift in the
mean quality of the group. Consider for instance the Boston Metropolitan Council for
Educational Opportunity (Metco) program, that sends students from Boston schools to
more affluent suburbs (where average ability is typically higher). What is the effect of this
kind of displacement on a pupil’s incentives to signal his ability? Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)
point out that behavior in the “honor-stigma” model can display strategic complementarity
or substitutability. We show that this naturally translates into two possible scenarios, a
“keeping up with the Joneses” effect, where better peers increase one’s incentive to perform,
3Optimal signal design often leads to coarse signals, see Harbaugh and Rasmussen (2014). In the case of
grading structures, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) show that a degree of coarseness is optimal when students
play status games (see also Zubrickas, 2015). Mazali and Rodrigues-Neto (2013) find that it is optimal for
status good producers to offer a finite number of brands/varieties.
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or a “small fish in a big pond” effect, where better peers may actually lower motivation.4 We
characterize the conditions under which the pressure to provide the costly signal increases
or decreases in peer quality. We show that these crucially depend on the shape and location
of the peer distribution. With symmetric unimodal distributions, an individual moving to a
higher quality group will face stronger incentives when the costly signal is provided by the
majority in both groups. However, if the signal is rare, then incentives are unambiguously
weakened (the small fish in a big pond effect). In that case, to boost incentives, someone
would actually have to be moved in the opposite direction, from the high to the low quality
group. This is because, in the low quality group, the costly signal is even rarer, and hence
the esteem (‘honor’) associated with signaling is stronger.
We then move to the case of a U-shaped distribution of types, where extreme types are
the most frequent. This is is for instance the case when considering household income in areas
with high wealth inequality, where the middle class is practically non-existent.5 In fact, this
type of distribution can be seen as a stylized version of a “polarized” or bimodal group. With
a U-shaped distribution we obtain opposite predictions to the unimodal case. For instance,
the small fish in a big pond effect is obtained when the costly signal is majoritarian in both
groups. As it will become clear, the reason for the reversal in the direction of comparative
statics is that, with unimodal distributions, incentives are strongest when the costly signal
is either provided by nearly everyone or almost no one. With U-shaped distributions, the
opposite happens. Incentives are strongest when the group is evenly split between those who
provide the signal and those who don’t.
Having looked at a shift in peer quality, we turn to peer heterogeneity. First, we assess
the effect of imposing truncations on the group distribution. This has clear policy relevance.
For instance, admission policies based on academic ability have been used in many countries
to establish selective schools where the distribution of pupils’ ability is left-truncated.6 In a
different context, left censored income distributions may be generated by policies mandating
4The small fish in a big pond effect is the subject of a sizeable empirical literature in Psychology (see
Marsh, 1987, and subsequent work), but has received little attention in theoretical Economics. A notable
exception, in a quite different context, is Frank (1985a).
5A case in point is the Washington D.C. area, where, according to 2014 data from the US Census Bureau,
the two modal income brackets are incomes below $25,000 per year and incomes above $150,000. A U-shaped
distribution is a good approximation for the distribution of household income.
6The old Grammar Schools system in Britain is a prominent example.
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a guaranteed minimum income for all members of society, as recently proposed by several
political commentators. We ask how these policies affect signaling incentives. Second, we
analyze the effect of a mean preserving spread. This may help to address questions such as:
How does the incentive to engage in conspicuous consumption change when inequality goes
up? Finally, we look at the effect of skewness, restricting attention to pairs of distributions
with identical mean that cannot be ranked in terms of second order stochastic dominance.
This may shed light, for instance, on what happens to the propensity to purchase positional
goods when the top 1% of the income distribution pull away from everyone else.
All our results are linked by a common theme: fatter tails increase signaling incentives.
Whenever distributions can be clearly ranked according to their tails, this delivers unam-
biguous predictions. This is for instance the case for truncations, where the two distributions
are isomorphic except for the fact that one (the truncated distribution) has the right or left
tail missing. The model accordingly predicts that the original distribution (the one without
truncation) provides stronger signaling incentives. This happens irrespectively of whether
the truncation is on the lower tail or on the upper tail. Intuitively, right truncations re-
duce the honor from providing the costly signal, while left truncations reduce the stigma
associated with failing to provide it.
In the case of second-order stochastic dominance the comparison between peer distribu-
tions is similarly unequivocal. In a more dispersed group, engaging in costly signaling means
pooling with a fatter tail of extremely high types and separating from a fatter tail of ex-
tremely low types. Both effects go in the same direction of increasing the value of the signal
and thus increasing incentives. Interestingly, this result stands in sharp contrast with the
predictions of recent literature on rank based comparisons (see e.g. Hopkins and Kornienko,
2009). We discuss in the next section why the two approaches deliver opposite predictions.
Finally, when considering skewness, we must rely on conditional predictions. The reason
is quite transparent. If f is more right-skewed than f ′, this implies that f has a fatter right
tail but a thinner left one. It is thus not possible to “rank” the two distributions based on how
fat their tails are. Nonetheless, the logic we have highlighted persists in those cases where one
tail is clearly more important than the other for incentive provision. Consider for instance
environments where the incentive to undertake costly signaling is primarily motivated by
honor (obtained by showing that one belongs to a handful of high type individuals providing
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the signal). In those cases, intuition suggests that a fatter right tail may be better suited
to motivate agents. Accordingly, we find that a more right skewed distribution provides
stronger incentives. The opposite happens in environments where, in equilibrium, incentives
are primarily motivated by stigma avoidance. In these cases, incentives are stronger with a
more left skewed distribution.
The main focus of our analysis is to characterize how the signaling incentives for a given
individual are affected by different peer type-distributions. Empirically, this is relevant
when it is possible to control for an individual’s type (e.g. through a within-subject type
of analysis). In some cases, however, within-subject data may not be available, but it may
still be possible to measure the aggregate effect of a policy change or an economic shock. It
is therefore instructive to investigate how aggregate signal provision changes under different
type distributions. For instance, if f ′ is a mean preserving spread of f , a relevant question
may be: how does the proportion of those providing the signal (e.g., engaging in conspicuous
consumption) in f compare with that in f ′? From this viewpoint, the change from f to
f ′ does not only affect incentives, but also the frequency of each type, thus generating a
composition effect. Intuitively, a mean preserving spread of the income distribution may
increase the number of agents who are too poor to afford the signal (as well as the super
rich). As a result, the effect of higher dispersion on aggregate provision is not a priori
obvious in spite of the fact that peer pressure is unambiguously stronger under f ′. In the
paper, we provide a number of results that shed light on the interplay between incentive and
composition effects. In particular, we ask when these effects go in the same direction, and
when they counteract each other.
It is worth mentioning that we use the expression incentives without any positive or
negative connotation. The welfare consequences of stronger incentives typically depend on
the precise application. For instance, incentives are presumably good when talking about
educational attainments, but are harmful when considering wasteful “money burning” types
of activities. Indeed, our running application and the related welfare analysis will focus on
the case of socially wasteful signals. As we will see, in these cases heavier tails are not
necessarily beneficial for society.
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1.1 Outline of the paper and relationship with the literature
This paper builds on and brings together a number of existing results, some of which will need
to be recast for completeness. Sections 2 and 3 review the “honor-stigma model” following
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and extend it to peer groups with U-shaped distributions. Clearly
enough, although our results are cast in terms of esteem concerns, the analysis applies equally
well to any binary action/continuous type version of Spence’s (1973) model – where the
sender’s utility is increasing in the receiver’s posterior belief. While Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006, 2011) mostly focus on the effects of monetary incentives and information disclosures,
Jewitt (2004) provides a number of technical results on the shape of distributions, pointing
to the “honor-stigma” model as a potential application.7 What we add to this literature is,
first of all, a systematic analysis of the distributional comparative statics (DCS) of signaling
incentives.
DCS on individual incentives In Section 4 we look at how the incentives to provide
the signal for each type of agent are affected by changes in the distribution of their peers’
quality. In practice, this reduces to studying how the marginal type – who is indifferent
between providing the signal and abstaining – responds to changes in the peer distribution.
Our first result considers the effect of a uniform shift in the quality distribution of peers.
Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) also look at the implications of this, but mostly within the context
of aggregate provision. We extend their results in the following directions: a) We determine
how (and when) individual incentives may actually decrease as peer quality improves; b) We
point out that the DCS dramatically change if the shape of the peer distribution changes
from unimodal to bimodal – as is for instance when comparing two neighborhoods where
most people are middle class or two neighborhoods where the middle class is absent. We
then move beyond uniform shifts to study the effects on incentives of changes in dispersion,
changes in skewness and of truncations of the peer distribution. The analysis builds on a
number of observations made by Jewitt (2004) – most notably, that the gains in esteem from
providing the signal can be represented in terms of the Lorenz curve associated with the
peer distribution. However, the comparative statics results we derive are, to our knowledge,
7Some of Jewitt’s results are not in the public domain. We thus provide proofs for some of his results that,
to our knowledge, have not already been proved elsewhere. Any inaccuracy in any of these proofs should be
attributed exclusively to us.
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entirely novel. As mentioned, the main theme that emerges from the analysis is that, in
general, “fatter tails” strengthen incentives.
DCS on aggregate provision A second contribution of this paper to the literature on
esteem concerns is that, even within the context of aggregate effects, we are able to extend
the analysis of Be´nabou and Tirole by looking at a number of manipulations of the peer
distribution, beyond simple uniform shifts. Section 5 provides comparative static results on
aggregate signal provision. In particular, we derive sufficient conditions for the proportion
of agents providing the signal to be increasing in dispersion, which links our work to the
literature on the effect of inequality on status seeking behavior. Our analysis differs from
most existing works on this topic in a number of respects. First, when looking at aggregate
provision, we find that dispersion both (i) affects incentives and thus the marginal type
(incentive effect); (ii) affects the frequency of each type, so that, even keeping incentives
constant, the proportion of agents providing the signal changes (composition effect). The
literature mostly focuses on fully separating outcomes (see e.g. Glazer and Konrad, 1996).
Under perfect separation, a change in the shape of the distribution only has a composition
effect but virtually no incentive effect.8 In our case, both effects are present. Second, different
from most of the literature, the binary nature of agents’ problem implies that the mapping
from types to optimal actions is a step function. Hence, standard techniques (e.g. Atkinson,
1970, Jensen, 2018) based on the concavity/convexity of the policy function are not directly
applicable.
Welfare and redistribution In Section 6, we apply our results to analyze welfare and
redistribution when signaling is purely wasteful and takes the form of conspicuous consump-
tion. Our focus is on a particular DCS, namely a compression in the income distribution
generated by higher taxes and transfers. Although intuition would suggest that more redis-
tribution always reduces signal provision, we find that this is not necessarily the case. In
particular, for low levels of redistributions, the relatively disadvantaged may choose to spend
the extra income on conspicuous consumption to separate from the very poor. Nonetheless,
we show that signal provision always decreases when redistribution is high enough. This
result echoes some of the effects highlighted in Levy and Razin (2015). Using a slightly
8This is because, in a separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility constraints do not depend on the
frequency of each type. As a result, incentives may be affected only by changes in the distribution’s support.
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different setting, they look at how costly income sorting into exclusive “clubs” may affect
preferences for redistribution. In line with their analysis, we also provide a number of results
on how the presence of income signaling affects the support for redistribution in society and
discuss the main differences between the two approaches.
Rank based comparisons The finding that an increase in dispersion may increase signal
provision is in contrast with the literature on rank-based comparisons, which typically finds
that higher inequality reduces the incentive to engage in status seeking behavior (see Hopkins
and Kornienko, 2004 and 2009).9 These models differ from ours both in the different way
status is attained – through rank rather than through beliefs about one’s type – and in the
nature of the action space (continuous rather than binary). As discussed in Section 8, in
a binary action framework where agents care about perceived rank, rather than perceived
type, the social incentive to act does not depend on the distribution of types.10 In Hopkins
and Kornienko’s work, however, actions are continuous. This ensures that the distribution of
types matters for incentives in spite of rank-based concerns. In their setup, higher inequality
reduces social competition because it increases the cost of keeping up with people higher up
on the social ladder. In contrast, in the honor-stigma framework, higher inequality increases
the esteem rewards from being pooled with the upper tail, thus providing stronger incentives.
Intuitively, these different predictions arise because changing the wealth distribution in the
honor-stigma model affects both individual endowments and the rewards from signaling,
while in a rank-based framework it only affects the distribution of endowments (see Hopkins
and Kornienko, 2010).
Finally, in Section 7 we briefly look at robustness to endogenous group formation. Section
8 offers concluding remarks.
9These models build on the work of Frank (1985b). Weiss and Fershtman (1998) and Postlewaite (2011)
provide surveys of status models in Economics.
10This is because rank is always uniformly distributed. As a result, if only agents with type above x provide
the signal, the difference in perceived rank between someone providing the signal and someone abstaining is
always the same independently of the underlying distribution. See also Section 8.
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2 The honor-stigma model
Each agent belongs to a group g (this could be an ethnic/cultural group, but also a school,
firm, fraternity, sport club). A group g has a continuum of (heterogenous) members indexed
by their type x ∈ [Xg, Xg]. The density of x, fg : [Xg, Xg] → R+, is assumed to be twice
differentiable, to have full support, a strictly increasing cumulative (CDF) Fg, a quantile
function F−1g , and a finite mean θg. All group members simultaneously choose action a ∈
{0, 1}. Group membership and the decision to provide the signal (a = 1) or abstain (a = 0)
are publicly observable but a member’s type x is not.
Each group member has preferences which depend on material welfare and esteem. Fol-
lowing Be´nabou and Tirole, a type x individual has utility,
U(a, x) + E(x|a, g). (1)
The first term captures the intrinsic utility associated to performing the action. The function
U : {0, 1}×R+ → R+ is assumed to be twice differentiable in x and with increasing differences
– i.e. v(x) ≡ U(1, x) − U(0, x) is strictly increasing – implying that performing the action
is less costly for (or affords higher benefits to) higher types. The second term reflects the
utility that a group member derives from esteem. The interpretation is that the group
member is concerned about the assessment of his type made by an external audience. The
external audience could be fellow group members or some individual (e.g. a potential mate
or employer) outside the group.
3 Preliminaries
We first characterize the equilibrium taking the distribution of types for group g as given. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a profile of strategies for group members and a belief function
for the audience such that: i) the strategy of each member is a best reply to the strategies
of others and the audience’s beliefs, ii) beliefs are derived from members’ strategies using
Bayes rule where possible. We say that the decision to perform the action is non-trivial for
group g if
v(Xg) +Xg − θg > 0 > v(Xg) + θg −Xg. (2)
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where, as already mentioned, v(x) ≡ U(1, x) − U(0, x). In words, it is strictly optimal for
the highest type to choose a = 1 when others choose a = 0 if, by doing this, he can reveal
himself. Symmetrically, it is strictly optimal for the lowest type to choose a = 0 even if this
reveals that he is the lowest type. In the remainder of the paper, whenever we will compare
two groups, we will assume that this condition is satisfied for both groups.
If the decision to perform the action is non-trivial, then, by continuity, there is at least
one equilibrium with an interior cutoff x∗, i.e. such that any member performs if and only
if x ≥ x∗.11 The marginal type x∗ is implicitly given by the indifference condition,
φg(x
∗) = −v(x∗) (3)
where
φg(x) ≡ m+(x; g)−m−(x; g), (4)
m+(x; g) ≡ E(X|X > x; g), m−(x; g) ≡ E(X|X < x; g) (5)
The function φg captures the gain in esteem obtained by providing the signal under a strategy
profile such that only types above x provide it. The value taken by x∗ can be seen as an
inverse measure of the strength of the incentives generated by peer pressure. When x∗
decreases, all types previously providing the signal keep sending it, while some types who
were previously abstaining switch to signal provision.
The shape of φg determines how incentives change with different cutoff values. Sup-
pose for instance that φg is negatively-sloped. This implies that, as provision becomes more
common (i.e., the cutoff decreases), the pool of abstainers worsens more than that of sig-
nal providers. As a result, the esteem gain associated with signal provision increases (or,
equivalently, the stigma associated with abstention increases), thus strengthening signaling
incentives. In other words, we have (endogenous) strategic complementarities. By converse,
when φg is positively sloped, wider signal provision worsens the pool of abstainers less than
it worsens that of signal providers. The honor associated with signaling is thus reduced,
generating (endogenous) substitutability. Clearly enough, the shape of φg (and thus the
nature of the strategic interaction) is determined by the shape of the underlying density fg.
In some cases, we will restrict attention to densities which experience at most one change of
11Full pooling equilibria where all agents abstain may also exist. However, given monotonicity of v, these
equilibria fail standard refinements like D1 (see Cho and Kreps, 1987). See supplementary material.
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monotonicity. This includes the cases familiar in the literature (Jewitt, 2004) of increasing,
decreasing, and unimodal densities, as well as the less familiar case of U-shaped densities.
Lemma 1. a) (Jewitt, 2004) If, fg is everywhere increasing (decreasing), then φg is ev-
erywhere decreasing (increasing). b) (Jewitt, 2004) If fg is increasing and then decreasing
(unimodal), then φg is quasi-convex. c) If fg is decreasing and then increasing (U-shaped),
then φg is quasi-concave.
Proof. See Jewitt (2004) (or Harbaugh and Rasmussen, 2014) for a) and b). We prove c) in
the Appendix using an argument mirroring Harbaugh and Rasmussen (2014).
The quasi-convexity/concavity results in Lemma 1 do not tell us much about the rela-
tionship between the esteem gain φg and x. These results can be strengthened if we focus on
densities such that, for all values of x in the support except (possibly) the one where mono-
tonicity changes, are either strictly increasing or decreasing. [In the rest of the paper, we will
slightly abuse terminology using the expression “with at most one change of monotonicity”
to indicate this type of densities.]
Lemma 2. (Unimodal case) If fg is strictly increasing and then decreasing, then there exists
xmin ∈ [Xg, Xg] such that φg is strictly decreasing for x < xmin and strictly increasing for
x > xmin. If fg is symmetric, then xmin coincides with the mode of fg.
(U-shaped case) If fg is strictly decreasing and then increasing, then there exists xmax ∈
[Xg, Xg] such that φg is strictly increasing for x < xmax and strictly decreasing for x > xmax.
If fg is symmetric, then xmax coincides with the anti-mode of fg.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that, xmin and xmax need not lie in the interior of the support (although this always
happens in the case of symmetric distributions). Harbaugh and Rasmussen (2014) provide
conditions under which xmin is interior. These can be interpreted as requiring that fg is not
too skewed. Similar results can be obtained for the U-shaped case.
The relationship between esteem concerns (captured by φg) and the shape of fg is illus-
trated in Figure 1 for symmetric densities.
Consider first the case where fg is unimodal (drawn on the figure’s left panel). Here,
esteem concerns are higher (i.e., φg(x) is larger) when the marginal type is located at the
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fg(x)
φg(x)
−v(x)
x∗
x
fg(x)
φg(x)
−v(x)
x∗
Figure 1: Equilibrium with unimodal and U shaped symmetric densities.
extremes of the distribution. This happens when the group is divided very unevenly between
signal provision and abstention, i.e. the signal is either provided by a large majority or by
a small minority. Intuitively, in these cases people are strongly motivated by the desire
to separate themselves from a few “bad apples”, or by the desire to establish themselves
as part of a selected minority of “stars”. When fg is U-shaped, the opposite happens.
Esteem concerns are highest when the marginal type is intermediate. This happens when
the group is evenly split between provision and abstention. Intuitively, this is because, when
the distribution is U-shaped, an intermediate cutoff makes the act of performing the action
very informative about the individual’s type.
From Lemma 2, the LHS in (3) is a non-monotonic function while the RHS is strictly
decreasing. A sufficient condition for a unique interior cutoff is thus that the RHS is every-
where steeper than the LHS. Following Be´nabou and Tirole (2006, 2011), we will accordingly
assume that, for all groups involved,
Assumption 1. (Uniqueness) −v′(x) < φ′g(x) for all x ∈ [Xg, Xg].
In the supplementary Appendix, we do away with this assumption and show that results
similar in spirit to the results discussed here can be obtained by looking at extreme equilibria
(see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). These are the equilibria with the lowest and highest
provision.
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4 DCS and individual incentives
In this section, we look at how incentives change as a result of manipulations of the peer
distribution – as captured by the DCS on the marginal type x∗.
4.1 Uniform shifts
In order to isolate the effect of a change in group quality on individual incentives, we consider
a family of identical densities which differ only in the mean parameter θg. It is clear that
such uniform shifts of the density fg will shift the net esteem function φg in the same way.
Proposition 1. Consider two groups g and g′ with fg and fg′ differing only in their mean,
with θg < θg′, and having at most one change of monotonicity. Then, φg and φg′ cross at
most once in (Xg′ , Xg). When the densities are non-monotone and φg and φg′ cross:
i x∗g and x∗g′ are always either both on the left or both on the right of the crossing point xˆ.
ii Unimodal case: If both x∗g and x∗g′ are on the right (left) of xˆ, then x
∗
g < (>) x
∗
g′.
iii U-shaped case: If both x∗g and x∗g′ are on the right (left) of xˆ, then x
∗
g > (<) x
∗
g′.
Moreover, if fg and fg′ are symmetric, then φg and φg′ necessarily cross and the crossing
point lies in the interval (θg, θg′). Finally, when the densities are monotone (or are non-
monotone but φg and φg′ do not cross), then x
∗
g′ < (>)x
∗
g whenever θg > (<)(Xg +Xg)/2.
Proof. See appendix.
The implications of Proposition 1 can be easily grasped by focusing on the case of sym-
metric densities. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the effect of a shift in the density on the equi-
librium cutoff for symmetric unimodal and U-shaped densities, respectively. Consider first
the unimodal case in Figure 2. In this case, esteem concerns are strongest when provision is
either extremely high or extremely low. Suppose we take a group g in which signal provision
is majoritarian, i.e., x∗g < θg, and we compare it with a higher quality group g′, as in the left
panel of Figure 2. Clearly enough, evaluated at x = x∗g, the higher quality group will exhibit
more signal provision (since a larger share of agents are located above x). Hence, in the
high quality group, the majoritarian behavior (i.e., providing the signal) will be even more
common. Incentives will therefore be stronger. The marginal type for the high quality group
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xφg′(x)
φg(x)
−v(x)
x∗gx
∗
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x
φg′(x)
φg(x)
−v(x)
x∗g x
∗
g′xˆ
Figure 2: Effect of better peers when action provision is majoritarian (left) and minoritarian
(right) [Unimodal density].
x
φg(x)
φg′(x)
−v(x)
x∗g′x
∗
g xˆ
x
φg(x)
φg′(x)
−v(x)
x∗g′ x
∗
gxˆ
Figure 3: Effect of better peers when action provision is majoritarian (left) and minoritarian
(right) [U-shaped density].
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must therefore lie below that of the low quality group. This has very practical implications.
If an individual moves from a group in which provision is majoritarian to a higher quality
group, he faces stronger incentives: the keeping up with the Joneses effect.
Consider now a group in which provision is minoritarian, i.e., x∗g > θg (right panel
of Figure 2). Evaluated at x = x∗g, a higher quality group g′ will exhibit more signal
provision (since a larger share of members are located above x). In the lower quality group
g, the majoritarian behavior (i.e., abstention) will thus be more common, and, hence, esteem
concerns will be stronger. The marginal type for the lower quality group must therefore
lie below that of the higher quality group. This delivers an intriguing implication. If an
individual moves from a group in which signal provision is minoritarian to a higher ability
group, he faces weaker incentives: the small fish in a big pond effect.
What about U-shaped densities? The mechanism at work is exactly the mirror image:
esteem concerns are stronger in the group that is closer to a half-half split. As Figure 3 shows,
this generates opposite comparative statics to the unimodal case. To sum up, Proposition 1
delivers the following rule of thumb,12
Corollary 1. In the symmetric unimodal (resp., U-shaped) case, if an individual is moved
– from a group in which provision is majoritarian to a higher quality group, or
– from a group in which provision is minoritarian to a lower quality group,
he faces stronger (resp., weaker) incentives to provide the signal.
Finally, note that similar effects obtain with asymmetric densities. However, in that
case, whether the φ functions are increasing or decreasing will not perfectly map majoritar-
ian/minoritarian behavior. Moreover, if the densities are very skewed (as for instance in the
case of monotone densities) it may happen that the φ functions never cross. In this case, one
of the two groups will provide uniformly stronger incentives. Nevertheless, the fundamental
insights are unchanged even in this case. For instance, if the density is strongly left skewed
(e.g. a strictly increasing density), the φ function will be generally downward sloping. In
12Notice however that Proposition 1 delivers a more general result, which allows to say what happens
also when one moves from a group where provision is minoritarian to a better group or from a group with
majoritarian provision to a worse group. In these cases, the direction of the effect crucially depends on
whether the two cutoffs x∗g and x
∗
g′ lie on the left or on the right of the point xˆ where the esteem gain from
signal provision is equal in both groups.
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other words, the gain in esteem tends to fade as more agents provide the signal. In turn, this
implies that the higher quality group – which has higher provision – will provide uniformly
weaker incentives. Symmetrically, with a strongly right skewed density (e.g. a decreasing
density), the gain in esteem increases as more agents choose to provide the signal, so that
the higher quality group provides stronger incentives.
The small fish in a big pond effect One of the key lessons of Proposition 1 is that
better peers may in some cases discourage, rather than encourage costly signaling.13 In this
case, moving the individual to a higher quality group may actually reduce motivation. With
unimodal densities, this small fish in a big pond effect emerges when signal provision is rare,
like for instance in the case of the award of a special prize. Winning such a prize may be very
valuable to a bright pupil from a school full of disadvantaged kids, since it allows him/her
to separate from the rest of the student body – which is perceived as generally weak. The
same may not be true if the same pupil attends a school mostly composed of middle class
kids. By converse, with U-shaped densities, the small fish effect arises when most pupils are
capable of sending the signal, like for instance passing a relatively easy test. Note however
that, as Figures 2 and 3 suggest, the small fish effect is to some extent a local result. With
unimodal densities, esteem incentives always increase if one moves to a group of sufficiently
higher ability.14 Symmetrically, with U-shaped densities, incentives always decrease if one
moves to a sufficiently worse group.Within the contest of education, the small fish in a big
pond effect is extensively documented by social psychologists (see Marsh, 1987, and related
literature). Psychological evidence suggests that pupils moving from mixed ability schools
to better schools often feel demoralized (Marsh et al. 1995).
Finally, we ask what happens when the action a is imperfectly observed by the audience.
13Given the binary nature of the signal, one may wonder what the relevant signal is. For instance, in the
case of university graduates, is it whether or not a student graduates, or whether or not they receive an
honors degree? The answer may depend on the relevant audience. For instance, official statistics tend to
report the share of graduates in a given neighborhood, often without distinguishing between honors degrees
and ordinary degrees. For some audiences (e.g. neighbors), there is probably not much loss of information in
pooling honors degree and ordinary degree holders together. Of course, this may not be true if the audience is
composed of potential employers, who may have a more direct incentive to distinguish between good graduates
and mediocre ones.
14Note that this is nevertheless consistent with Proposition 1, since the shift would need to be large enough
to move the crossing point xˆ to the right of both cutoffs.
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This is analyzed in detail in the supplementary material. Two results stand out. First, a
more noisy signal generally lowers esteem concerns. Second, the way noise is introduced is
important. While in some cases all comparative statics trivially carry through, we provide
a plausible example where additional effects arise. This is the case where the audience only
observes “pass” or “fail” in a test, whose outcome is imperfectly correlated with the effort
a ∈ {0, 1} exerted by the agent. In this case, we show that, as the test becomes more noisy,
incentives are most weakened when the marginal type is extreme, so that provision is either
very high or very low. Reducing the correlation between agents’ action and observed signals
is thus somehow similar to making the distribution more U-shaped. The intuition is that,
when it is known that the overwhelming majority exert effort, a fail tends to be imputed to
bad luck, thus carrying less stigma. For similar reasons, less honor is attached to a pass if it
is known that hardly anyone exerts effort and the test has a degree of randomness.
4.2 Truncations and censoring
In many cases, group distributions may present some form of censoring or truncation, either
left or right (or both). Examples of left truncations are admissions policies to academic
programmes, where the objective is the exclusion of the less talented students. Right trun-
cations are more rarely advertised but equally common. A typical example would be semi-
professional sport circuits, where the most talented have incentive to turn fully professional
and thus leave the circuit. In this section we analyze the effect of truncations or censoring
on the incentive to perform the status enhancing action. Note that a truncation affects both
the group’s mean and its heterogeneity. Different from the previous section, however, the
change in the mean is not generated by a uniform shift in the distribution and the previous
results are not immediately applicable. Suppose then that group g′ is identical to group g,
except for a left truncation of the distribution. Formally, for some k in the support of fg,
fg′(x) =

fg(x)
1−Fg(k) x ≥ k
0 x < k
(6)
Right truncations are defined in a symmetric way. We also consider the case of censoring,
whereby all the mass in the left (right) tail, F (k) (1 − F (k)), is reallocated to an atom at
point k. We retain the assumption that the decision to send the signal is non-trivial also for
the truncated/censored group. In other words, we focus on truncations such that the mass
18
of both abstainers and signal providers in the truncated/censored group remains strictly
positive.
Proposition 2. Consider a group g with density fg and let g
′ denote a group with density
fg′ obtained by truncating or censoring fg. Then, so long as x
∗
g′ is interior to the support of
the truncated/censored distribution, the incentives to provide the signal under g′ are weaker
than under g, i.e. x∗g′ > x
∗
g. This applies irrespectively of whether the truncation/censoring
is on the left or right tail (or on both tails).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes a strong result: Truncations or censoring reduce incentives.
This applies irrespectively of the shape of the original distribution. Intuitively, left trunca-
tions/censoring reduce the stigma associated with abstention, while right truncations/censoring
reduce the honor associated with provision. Below, we provide an example of a policy leading
to a left censoring of the distribution.
Example: Guaranteed minimum income and conspicuous consumption In recent
years, several political commentators, both on the left and the right, have argued in favor of
reforming the welfare systems of developed economies to guarantee a minimum income to all
citizens/residents. Here, we analyze the effect of this policy on the propensity to engage in
conspicuous consumption. Consider a consumer with material utility (i.e. abstracting from
esteem) U(a,C) where C ≥ 0 is a composite good and a ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not the
individual purchases an indivisible “conspicuous” good. The good could be a pure positional
good with no intrinsic value (an ugly abstract art piece), but also a fancy house or car. What
matters is that its consumption is observable while the consumption of C is not. The price of
the composite good is normalized to 1. For simplicity, we assume that the conspicuous good
has elastic supply at price pi > 0. The consumer faces budget constraint C + api = x, where
x is income. We assume that people care about consumption and the perception others have
of their income, x. The total net utility (including esteem) from consumption of a is thus
v(x;pi) + E(x|a = 1) − E(x|a = 0), where v(x;pi) ≡ U(1, x − pi) − U(0, x) is assumed to
be increasing in x (i.e. a is a normal good) and sufficiently steep (so that Assumption 1 is
satisfied). We also assume that the price pi is neither too low nor too high, so that an interior
income cutoff x∗ exists.
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Consider now the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income x, so that all types
below x are guaranteed a post-policy income of x. This may be achieved by topping up
their initial income through government transfers or by regulating/subsidising their wages,
or through a mix of transfers and labour market interventions. We abstract from the details
of funding sources, although it is worth noting that the introduction of a progressive income
tax to fund the policy would generally strengthen the result we highlight below.15
Income (x)
x
Figure 4: A guaranteed minimum income induces a left censoring of the pre-transfers income
distribution.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the ex-post income distribution is a left censored version of
the initial distribution. The mass in the left tail is moved to the right to create an atom at
the minimum income x. How would this affect consumption choices? Proposition 2 implies
that the propensity to consume the conspicuous good will be lower as a result of the policy.
In other words, a guaranteed minimum income induces a reallocation of consumption away
from the conspicuous good. Intuitively, by eliminating the left tail, the policy reduces the
stigma associated with being pooled with the poor.16
It is worth however emphasizing that – so long as the policy is implemented through
direct transfers – the implicit assumption that agents are concerned about the perception of
their post-transfers income is not innocuous. If agents cared instead only about their inferred
15A budget balanced redistributive policy is considered in Section 6.
16Note that, while the individual propensity to consume the conspicuous good always drops, a reduction
in aggregate demand requires that the minimum income x is not so high as to fall above the (now increased)
cutoff.
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initial income, the transfers would not change signaling incentives. In practice, this suggests
that the means through which the policy is implemented may matter. For instance, the
effect of the policy may be different if the guaranteed minimum income is mainly achieved
through government handouts or through other tools like minimum wage regulation.
4.3 Dispersion
The result on truncations hints at the main theme of this section, namely that “fatter tails”
increase the esteem gain from performing the action and thus the incentive to perform. We
now illustrate this point by considering groups that can be ordered in terms of their disper-
sion. We thus assume that group g and g′ have identical means, but group g’s distribution
is second order stochastically dominated by group g′.
Comparing g and g′ is not immediately obvious. However, as pointed out by Jewitt
(2004), the function φ(x) can be expressed in terms of the Lorenz curve associated with the
type distribution. Setting p ≡ F (x),
φ(x) = E(X|X > x)− E(X|X < x) = θp− L(p)
p(1− p) ≡ Φ(p) (7)
where L(p) ≡ 1θ
∫ p
0 F
−1(s)ds is the Lorenz curve. Consider then two groups, g and g′,
with identical mean θ. Assume that the Lorenz curve of group g, Lg, lies below Lg′ for
all p ∈ (0, 1). Clearly enough, Φg(p) > Φg′(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). This in turn implies that
φg(x) > φg′(x) for all x ∈ (Xg, Xg).17 Since the two distributions have identical mean,
saying that Lg lies below Lg′ is equivalent to saying that fg is second order stochastically
dominated by fg′ (see e.g. Atkinson, 1970). This leads us to the following result,
Lemma 3. If fg and fg′ have identical mean and fg is second order stochastically dominated
by fg′, then φg(x) > φg′(x) for all x ∈ (Xg, Xg).
Proof. In text.
Lemma 3 establishes that esteem concerns are stronger when the group is more dispersed.
Figure 5 provides a visual illustration of the result in Lemma 3 and its implications for
incentive provision. These are summarized in the following result.
17Notice that the two groups need not have the same support. In principle, the support for the distribution
of group g′ could be a strict subset of that for group g.
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xfg′(x)
fg(x)
x
φg(x)
φg′(x)
−v(x)
x∗g x
∗
g′
Figure 5: If fg is second order dominated by fg′ , then φg lies above φg′ .
Proposition 3. Consider two groups with densities fg and fg′ with identical mean. Then,
if fg is second order dominated by fg′, the incentives to provide the signal are stronger in
group g than in group g′, i.e. x∗g′ > x
∗
g.
Proof. Directly from Lemma 3 and the fact that the LHS of (3) is decreasing in x.
Proposition 3 thus establishes an unambiguous relationship between group dispersion and
incentives. Intuitively, a more dispersed group increases the rewards from social signaling.
In a more dispersed group, providing the signal means pooling with a fatter right tail of
very high types and, at the same time, separating from a fatter left tail of extremely low
types. It is straightforward to verify that any symmetric unimodal density second order
dominates any symmetric U-shaped density with identical mean and the same (or larger)
support. Applying Proposition 3, this implies,
Corollary 2. Consider any two groups g and g′ with symmetric densities fg and fg′, both
with mean θ and with [Xg′ , Xg′ ] ⊆ [Xg, Xg]. Then, if fg′ is unimodal and fg is U-shaped,
group g provides stronger incentives.
Example: Inequality and conspicuous consumption The example discussed in the
previous section can now be used to shed light on the relationship between inequality and
conspicuous consumption at a more general level.18 Given Proposition 3, it is clear that the
propensity to consume the “observable” consumption good a is higher in groups with a more
18Bowles and Park (2005) suggest that the observed positive relationship between increased inequality and
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unequal distribution of wealth. Glazer and Konrad (1996) analyze a similar problem in a
model where status is signalled by charity donations. The key difference with the present
model is that they focus on a fully separating equilibrium (which is feasible in their case
since donations are a continuous variable). In a fully separating equilibrium, the shape of the
distribution does not affect the incentives of each type because the incentive compatibility
constraints are independent of the types’ frequencies. By converse, our result is entirely
driven by (partial) pooling. Inequality increases the incentive to purchase the observable
good by allowing one to pool with a fatter tail of super rich individuals (and to separate
from a fatter tail of extremely poor individuals). This effect is therefore absent in their
model.19 Moreover, while it seems natural to model charitable donations as a continuous
variable, it is clear that many status symbols come in the form of “lumpy” indivisible goods
(e.g. luxury watches, sports cars, branded suits).20
To conclude this section, we note what happens when the signal observed by the audience
is imperfectly correlated with the action taken by the agent. This is analyzed in more detail
in the supplementary appendix where we look at the example of a test whose outcome (pass,
fail) is a noisy signal of the agent’s effort. We establish there that, at least in the case
where both types and noise are symmetrically distributed, a mean preserving spread has
two mutually reinforcing effects on incentives.21 One is the tail fattening effect discussed
above. The second effect is due to the mean preserving spread increasing in the informative
content of the noisy signal relative to the information conveyed by peer group membership.
longer working hours may be due to an increase in conspicuous consumption in order to “keep up with the
Joneses” (see also Frank et al. 2005).
19In a model with continuous effort but discrete types, Lee (2007) shows that US college students exert
more effort than their East Asian counterparts. The result is driven by the fact that, because of selection
based on high school achievements, East Asian colleges are more homogeneous in terms of ability.
20Even in the case of donations, however, professional fundraisers typically find ways to make giving more
or less visible according to whether the pledged amount fall above or below certain thresholds. For instance,
membership of the exclusive Leader’s Group of donors of the UK Tory party entitles the donor to participate
in social events with senior party members and have his/her name listed on the party’s website. A donor has
access to these benefits only by making a donation of GBP 50,000 or more.
21 More precisely, we prove the result for the case where 1) the probability of passing when shirking is the
same as the probability of failing when exerting effort; 2) Types are symmetrically distributed. When either
1) or 2) fail, further effects arise which may reduce the effect of a mean preserving spread in some situations.
These effects are briefly discussed in the supplementary appendix.
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Intuitively, suppose that the group distribution is initially very concentrated around the
mean. The type of any individual drawn from that distribution is thus likely to be in a small
neighborhood of the mean. In that case, the posterior beliefs upon observing the result of
a noisy test will be close to the mean, independently of whether the agent passes or fails.
Following a mean preserving spread, however, the type distribution becomes more dispersed.
As group membership becomes less informative, posterior beliefs become more sensitive to
the result of the noisy test, thus providing stronger incentives.
4.4 Skewness
In this section, we analyze what happens when the peer distribution becomes more right or
left skewed. The results here complement and, to some extent, generalize the observations
already made for truncations. For convenience, we will rank location scale families of dis-
tributions according to how right skewed they are using the criterion proposed by Jewitt
(2004). The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 6. Both fg′ and fg′′ belong to the same family
and are more “right skewed” than fg, in the sense that they have thinner left tails and fatter
right tails. Note that distributions in the same location scale family as fg′ and fg′′ cross fg
at most three times (as fg′ does) and, when three crossings occur, the first is from below.
x
fg fg′′fg′
Figure 6: fg′ and fg′′ are more right skewed than fg.
Definition 1. Let f and f˜ be two densities and let F and F˜ denote their respective location
scale families. If F and F˜ have the property that any pair of densities (h, h˜) ∈ F × F˜ cross
at most three times and that, when they do cross exactly three times, the first crossing has
h˜ ∈ F˜ crossing h ∈ F from below, then f˜ is more right skewed than f .
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Jewitt (2004) shows that if a distribution is more right skewed than another according
to the above criterion, then it also has a higher third standardized moment, although the
reverse is not necessarily true.
In order to isolate the effect of skewness, it seems appropriate to compare distributions
with identical mean (although not necessarily with identical support). In this case, how
distributions compare in terms of their skewness (as defined above) has implications for the
behavior of their Lorenz curves.
Lemma 4. (Jewitt, 2004) Suppose that fg′ and fg have the same mean, θ, and that fg′ is
more right skewed than fg. Then, the Lorenz curves Lg(p) ≡ 1θ
∫ p
0 F
−1
g (s)ds and Lg′(p) ≡
1
θ
∫ p
0 F
−1
g′ (s)ds cross at most once for p ∈ (0, 1) and, if they do cross, Lg crosses Lg′ from
above.
Proof. See appendix.
As already noted in the previous section, Lorenz dominance implies second order stochas-
tic dominance for distributions with identical means. We are thus left with two possible
outcomes. Either one of the two distributions is Lorenz-dominated – which means that it is
also second order stochastically dominated – or the Lorenz curves of the two distributions
must cross exactly once. In terms of the net esteem function Φ(p) given in (7), this implies,
Lemma 5. Suppose that fg and fg′ have the same mean and that fg′ is more right skewed
than fg. Then, either one distribution is second order dominated by the other, or there exists
pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that Φg(p) > Φg′(p) for all p < pˆ and Φg(p) < Φg′(p) for all p > pˆ.
Proof. See appendix.
We already analyzed the effect of dispersion on incentives in the previous section. If
one distribution is second order dominated by the other, then it provides uniformly stronger
incentives. If we want to isolate the effect of skewness, we need to focus on the case where
neither of the two distributions is second order dominated.
Proposition 4. Suppose that fg and fg′ have the same mean and cannot be ranked according
to second order dominance, but fg′ is more right skewed than fg. Then, there exists a critical
mass of agents pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that, if the share of abstainers is lower than pˆ in both groups,
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group g provides stronger incentives, i.e. x∗g < x∗g′. If the share of abstainers is greater than
pˆ in both groups, then group g′ provides stronger incentives, i.e. x∗g > x∗g′.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, a peer group with a more right skewed distribution provides stronger incen-
tives when provision is rare, so that honor is the main concern. This is because, by providing
the signal, one can pool with a fatter tail of very high types. By converse, when provision
is widespread and the stigma from failing to provide the signal is the main worry, incentives
are stronger under a more left-skewed distribution.
Example: Conspicuous Consumption and Inequality (continued) Rather than ana-
lyzing the effect of a mean preserving spread in the distribution of income, we can ask what
happens when the income distribution becomes more or less right skewed. If the conspicuous
good is very expensive (e.g. a yacht) so that a sufficiently small fraction of the population
consumes it, a more right skewed distribution provides a stronger incentive to consume it.
On the other hand, when it is relatively affordable, a more left-skewed distribution provides
stronger incentives.
5 DCS and aggregate signal provision
The previous section looked at how incentives change following a change in the peer group
distribution. In particular, we derived conditions under which the marginal type in group
g is smaller than in group g′, so that all types who provide the signal under g′ also provide
the signal under g and some types switch from abstention to provision. This is relevant for
questions like: would moving a pupil to a more diverse school improve or weaken his academic
record? How do existing members of a group (community, firm’s employees, school) react
to inflows or outflows of new and potentially different agents (e.g. because of immigration,
mergers, changes in catchment area)?22
On the other hand, policy makers and empirical researchers may also be interested in
more aggregate effects, like changes in the total share of abstainers vis-a`-vis signal providers
following changes in the distribution. For instance, in the context of conspicuous consump-
tion, one may ask how the demand for the conspicuous good 1 − Fg(x∗g) is affected by the
22See Grout et al. (2015) for an analysis of these issues within the context of coordination problems.
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minimum income policy or by redistribution in general.
Under most manipulations of fg, there will be two effects on aggregate provision. The
first, which we call the incentive effect is the shift in the cutoff x∗ discussed so far. The
second effect, which is essentially a composition effect, is purely mechanical. Keeping the
cutoff constant, any manipulation of the distribution shifts the probability mass away from
some types and toward other types – who may or may not provide the signal. For instance,
a mean preserving spread of the income distribution would increase both the frequency of
disadvantaged individuals and that of the well off, while reducing the frequency of agents
with average income. Since signal provision is different across income levels, this will directly
affect aggregate provision. The two effects may go in the same direction or may counteract
each other. In this section we provide an account on how they interact. For reasons of space,
some formal results are made available in the supplementary appendix.
5.1 Uniform shifts
The effect of uniform shifts on aggregate provision is analyzed in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006,
2011). We refer the reader to their works. To summarize, right shifts of the distribution
always increase aggregate provision. Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) also note that the social
multipliers may be larger than one (when there is strategic complementarity) or lower than
one (strategic substitutability). In terms of our analysis, a multiplier lower than unity occurs
whenever there is a small fish in a big pond effect, so that the incentive effect partially offsets
the composition effect. Symmetrically, a multiplier larger than one occurs when the incentive
effect reinforces the composition effect.
5.2 Truncations, censoring and group splits
For the purposes of analyzing aggregate provision, it is necessary to distinguish between two
types of manipulations,
1. A “proper” truncation or a “proper” censoring in the sense that the truncated/censored
group has the same size as the initial group23
23If fg′ is obtained through a left truncation/censoring of fg, then the total mass of agents is
∫Xg
k
fg′(x)dx =∫Xg
Xg
fg(x)dx = 1. The same applies to right truncations/censoring, but clearly does not hold when the initial
group is split into smaller subgroups.
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2. A mere group split, which divides the initial group into two smaller subgroups of size
Fg(k) and 1− Fg(k), respectively
The first case can be thought of as the case of a school introducing screening at entry level,
while keeping the number of pupils constant. The minimum income application similarly
involves a proper censoring. The second case applies if a class of pupils is split into two
smaller subgroups based on ability. We look at both these cases in the supplementary
appendix. For group splits, the composition effect is largely immaterial. It is thus easy to
apply Proposition 2 to establish that, so long as at least one of the two subgroups has an
interior cutoff, overall provision across both subgroups must fall (see Proposition 12). In the
first case, the composition effect plays a more complex role. For example, the left censoring
described in the minimum income application takes the mass of poor agents in the left tail
and reallocates it at the minimum income, keeping group size constant. Focusing again on
the non-degenerate case where the ex-post cutoff is interior to the truncation/censoring, our
results confirm the intuition that both left and right censoring always lead to lower aggregate
provision (see Proposition 13). The same applies to right truncations, but not necessarily to
left truncations. For left truncations, the incentive and composition effects go in opposite
directions. Intuitively, one can think of a left truncation as if the mass in the left tail below
k were “spread” over all types in the [k,Xg] support, including types above the cutoff x
∗
g′
who provide the signal. Hence, while peer pressure is weaker, the changed composition may
favor higher provision.
In terms of implications, this suggests that, keeping the overall number of students con-
stant, if the top students are moved out of a school, aggregate school performance always
decreases (both because of weaker incentives and because of the higher frequency of relatively
weak students). However, if the worst students are removed, aggregate school performance
may go up or down depending on the strength of the incentive effect.
5.3 Dispersion
As shown above, a mean preserving spread unambiguously increases esteem incentives. How-
ever, a mean preserving spread also tends to shift the mass away from the median and towards
the tails of the distribution. In the conspicuous consumption application, this implies more
super rich but also more super poor (who may struggle to afford the conspicuous good). As
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a result, the overall effect on aggregate provision is not a priori clear.
It is known that second order dominance imposes little structure on the relationship
between two densities, so that, outside the convenient cases where the mapping from types
into actions is a concave or convex function, not much can be said about aggregate effects.
Similar to most of the literature, we thus build intuition by imposing a more precise structure
on how the two distributions relate to each other.24 We start with the case where the two
densities cross only twice (so that the CDFs cross only once), as depicted in Figure 5 (and
as in the standard textbook description of a mean preserving spread).25 The next result
establishes that the composition effect reinforces the incentive effect when signal provision
is rare, so that the aggregate effect of greater dispersion is unambiguous. In contrast, the
two effects go in opposite directions if signal provision is widespread (since more dispersion
makes the left tail heavier).
Proposition 5. Suppose that fg and fg′ have the same mean and fg is second order domi-
nated by fg′, with the two densities crossing exactly twice. Then, there exists a unique value
for the proportion of abstainers pˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying F−1g (pˆ) = F−1g′ (pˆ). If the actual propor-
tion of abstainers in group g is larger than the critical value pˆ, then aggregate provision will
be larger in group g than in g′. If the actual proportion of abstainers in group g is smaller
than pˆ, then aggregate provision will be larger in group g′ when v(x) is sufficiently steep for
types x < F−1g (pˆ).
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 1. If fg and fg′ are both symmetric, then pˆ = 1/2, i.e. it is sufficient that provision
is minoritarian to ensure that it is larger in group g than in g′.
Example: dispersion and demand for the conspicuous good Consider how the de-
mand for the conspicuous good 1 − Fg(x∗g) is affected by a mean preserving spread of the
income distribution. Intuitively, if the conspicuous good is very expensive, so that only a
minority can afford it, then more inequality implies both stronger incentives and a heavier
24For instance, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) propose a unimodal likelihood ratio ordering to strengthen
second order dominance. Levy and Razin (2015) use instead the concept of monotone mean preserving
contraction.
25For densities with the same support, the requirement that they only cross twice is implied by the Unimodal
Likelihood Ratio ordering proposed by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
29
tail of super rich with the means to provide the signal. However, if conspicuous consump-
tion is widespread, so that stigma is the agents’ main concern, then a more unequal society
may induce higher or lower demand. The result in this case depends on how steep is the
v function for low income individuals. Intuitively, if v is approximately vertical, the cutoff
does not move much and the incentive effect is negligible. At the same time, the fattening
of the left tail reduces provision. The slope of v can be shown to depend on two factors:
1) the affordability of the conspicuous good for individuals in the lower tail and 2) the
strength of the complementarity in consumption between the conspicuous good and other
goods. Conspicuous goods that absorb a large fraction of income for the lower tail and that
are more attractive when consumed jointly with the composite good will exhibit a steeper v
function.26 We can thus broadly identify three scenarios, depending on the exact nature of
the conspicuous good.
1. The conspicuous good is an elite good (e.g. private yachts). In this case, the demand
for the conspicuous good will increase as inequality increases.
2. The conspicuous good complements other consumption and, while widespread, involves
relatively large expenditures (e.g. private vehicles). In this case, the demand for the
good will generally be inversely related to inequality.
3. The conspicuous good is affordable and does not complement other consumption (e.g.
nail salon services). In this case, demand will typically increase with inequality.
In the supplementary appendix, we extend the result in Proposition 5 by ditching the
two density crossings requirement and assuming more generally that the the CDFs cross an
odd number of times. Further insights on the relationship between dispersion and aggregate
signal provision can be obtained if we follow Glazer and Konrad (1996) and take a parametric
26The derivative of v(x) can be decomposed into
dv
dx
=
[
∂U(1, x− pi)
∂x
− ∂U(1, x)
∂x
]
+
[
∂U(1, x)
∂x
− ∂U(0, x)
∂x
]
(8)
The first term in brackets is large when the marginal utility from the composite goods is sharply decreasing
(e.g. consuming the conspicuous good implies below subsistence consumption of other goods) and/or the
amount of composite good that needs to be given up is large. The second term is large when the two goods
are strong complements.
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approach. The following result analyzes how aggregate provision reacts to an increase in
standard deviation keeping the mean constant.
Proposition 6. Let x = θ + σz, σ ∈ R+, where E(z) = 0, V ar(z) = 1 (so that E(x) = θ
and V ar(x) = σ2).
1. Suppose that the signal is costly for the mean type (v(θ) < 0). Then, there exists  > 0
such that, if v′′(x) > − for all x (i.e. v is not too concave), aggregate provision is
increasing in σ.
2. Suppose that the mean type intrinsically benefits from providing the signal (v(θ) > 0).
Then, there exists  > 0 such that, if v′′(x) <  for all x (i.e. v is not too convex),
aggregate provision is decreasing in σ.
Proof. See appendix.
Suppose first that v is linear, as for instance in Be´nabou and Tirole (2011). In this case,
Proposition 6 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for an increase of the standard
deviation to result in an increase in aggregate provision. This happens if and only if the
signal is costly for the mean type. To see the intuition, it is useful to think about what
happens when the standard deviation decreases. This has two effects. First, the mass of
agents is “pushed” toward the mean. Second, esteem concerns are weaker. If the mean type
would provide the signal even in the absence of image concerns, such a contraction of the
distribution can only increase aggregate provision. However, in the more standard case where
the signal is costly for the mean type, so that he would not provide it absent image concerns,
then the contraction results in a reduction of aggregate provision. More generally, if the
signal is costly for the mean type, aggregate provision increases in the standard deviation if
v′(x) is not too decreasing. This is needed to ensure that v(x) is never too steep for types in
the left tail, so that, when the share of abstainers is low, the cutoff is sufficiently sensitive
to changes in σ. In other words, the incentive effect dominates. The opposite happens when
the mean type intrinsically benefits from providing the signal and v′(x) is non-increasing.
We will come back to this result in Section 6 when we will discuss the effects of redistribution
in more detail.
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5.4 Skewness
The interaction between the incentive effect and the composition effect as the distribution
becomes more right skewed is quite complex. A detailed analysis is provided in the sup-
plementary appendix. We show there that the two effects go in the same direction when
the share of abstainers is sufficiently large (toward increased aggregate provision) and for
intermediate values of the share of abstainers (toward reduced provision). In general, as seen
in Proposition 4, the incentive effect favors higher provision if the proportion of abstainers
is above a certain level. In contrast, the composition effect favors higher provision if the
proportion of abstainers is either very high or very low, while it induces lower provision for
intermediate levels of abstention.
6 Welfare and redistribution under purely wasteful signals
In this section, we focus on the conspicuous consumption application to ask several questions
about welfare: is redistribution beneficial? When does a majority in favor of redistribution
exist? How do taxes and transfers affect the incentive to provide the signal? In order to
cast our results in stark and clear terms, we focus on the case where the signal is wasteful.
In particular, we assume U(1, x) = u(x) and U(0, x) = u(x − pi) with u : R+ → R+ strictly
increasing and pi > 0 denoting the price of the conspicuous good.27 The cost of the signal
is thus −v(x) = u(x) − u(x − pi) which is positive for all x ∈ [X,X]. As a first step, we
follow Levy and Razin (2015) and analyze a full redistribution (FR) scheme under which
each individual in the peer group faces a 100% tax rate and is provided a transfer equal to
the group’s mean income θ. Clearly enough, in the presence of FR there is no incentive to
provide the costly signal. We note the following facts,
1. FR is socially optimal whenever the marginal utility of income is non-increasing, i.e.
u is (weakly) concave.
2. Even if FR is optimal, a majority supporting FR need not exist.
3. When the mean, θ, is weakly larger than the median, µ, sufficient conditions for a
27We implicitly assume that agents with x < pi have no choice but to abstain.
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majority in favor of FR are that either x∗ ≥ µ (i.e. the median type abstains) or that
φ(µ)
2
< u(θ)− u(µ− pi). (9)
All these statements are formally established in the supplementary appendix, where we
also provide sufficient conditions for the less empirically relevant case where the median is
above the mean. The logic for the first statement is standard. Since the signal is wasteful,
it is sufficient that the utility of income is not convex to ensure that FR is optimal. As for
statement 2, we work out in the supplementary appendix a counterexample with log utility
and uniformly distributed income where for parameter values the majority opposes FR. This
seems to happen when the price of the conspicuous good is low – so that signal provision is
widespread – and agents are more concerned with esteem than with material consumption.
Intuitively, under these circumstances, the median income agent and those slightly below are
willing to bear the cost of the signal (and possibly forgo higher post transfer income) in order
to separate themselves from those in the low tail. Statement 3 generalizes these insights. To
gather intuition on condition (9), consider first the case of symmetric distributions, so that
θ = µ. In this case, (9) reduces to
φ(µ)
2
< −v(µ). (10)
The RHS is the cost of the signal to the mean/median type in terms of forgone utility from
consumption. The LHS is the extra esteem obtained from pooling with the right tail relative
to being perceived as mean/median, when the median is the marginal type.28 Back to (9),
relative to the case of a symmetric distribution, a more skewed distribution (in the sense
of θ much larger than µ) makes FR easier to sustain. A less skewed distribution makes it
harder. These effects are also standard (see e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Finally, FR
can always be sustained if those who provide the signal in equilibrium are a minority and
the mean is above the median. Intuitively, in this case all individuals with income below
the median abstain in equilibrium. FR makes them better off both in terms of post transfer
income – since their income is less than the mean income – and esteem – since they do not
face stigma.
Having analyzed FR, we now turn to a different question. We have already seen in the
previous sections that a compression of the distribution does not necessarily lead to fewer
28Note that, for symmetric densities, E[x|x > θ]− θ = φ(θ)/2.
33
agents providing the costly signal. Consider then a scheme where each individual faces a tax
rate t ∈ (0, 1) and is provided by the government a handout equal to tθ, so that the scheme
balances the budget. We can build on the result in Proposition 6 to ask how such a scheme
would affect signal provision.
Proposition 7. Aggregate provision of the wasteful signal is not generally decreasing in the
intensity of redistribution, as measured by t. However, there always exists tˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
aggregate provision is decreasing in t for all t ≥ tˆ. Monotonicity for all t ∈ (0, 1) obtains
whenever v(x) is weakly convex and/or the price of the conspicuous good pi is larger than θ.
Proof. See supplementary appendix.
The first statement says that redistribution does not necessarily reduce the aggregate
distortion due to signaling. In the supplementary appendix, we provide an example based
on log utility and a uniform income distribution. Intuitively, as laid out in the previous
sections, redistribution has both an incentive effect and a composition effect. Increasing
taxes and transfers reduces the incentive for status seeking. On the other hand, it may make
the costly signal affordable to the less well off. The second effect may in some cases outweigh
the first. Essentially, this result echoes the concerns of some moralists since Victorian times
that cash handed out to the masses may end up being wasted on “frivolous” consumption.
In contrast, the second statement says that, although redistribution may actually increase
the share of those purchasing the conspicuous good, this can only happen if there is too little
redistribution in the first place. For groups that are already sufficiently egalitarian the effect
is unambiguous and goes in the direction of reducing aggregate conspicuous consumption.
The last statement says that the effect is similarly unambiguous if either v(x) is convex –
so that −v(x) is relatively flat for low income agents – or the conspicuous good is an elite
good which is affordable only by the rich. Intuitively, the first condition ensures that the
composition effect is never too strong. The second condition instead makes sure that the
composition effect reinforces the incentive effect.
More generally, as shown in the proof of Proposition 7, if society is sufficiently egalitarian,
the marginal type will be in the right tail. When this happens, the median type and everyone
below support FR unless the income distribution is extremely left skewed. This implies that,
while the majority may not always support FR, this is generally the case if inequality is
34
already low. This echoes the results obtained in Levy and Razin’s (2015) sorting model,
and points to a “self sustaining” process, whereby redistribution breeds appetite for further
reduction of inequality. An important difference between the two frameworks is that, in our
model, the esteem reward from (partial) separation is the same for all types. In contrast, in
Levy and Razin’s model, there are complementarities between an individual’s income and
that of those he interacts with, so that higher types benefit more from separation. This
implies that the welfare gains from sorting/separating tend to be larger than in the case
of the honor-stigma model. For this reason, much of their focus is on cases where FR is
supported even when inefficient. In our case, the opposite problem arises.29
7 Peer pressure under endogenous group formation
So far, we have considered the case where individuals were exogenously assigned to a peer
group. In practice, individuals may have some freedom in choosing their peers within a
given set of potential peers. For instance, pupils attending a local school will typically sort
themselves into cliques of friends, social clubs, etc. The main result of this section is that
this endogenous sorting does not affect signaling incentives so long as 1) types are private
information, and 2) status seeking is the only reason for joining a group. In particular, so long
as groups can only restrict membership based on observable behavior, then all equilibrium
allocations of individuals into groups (including the one where all individuals join the grand
coalition) provide the same incentives. It thus makes sense to analyze incentives taking the
(exogenously given) grand coalition as the relevant peer group.
Consider a continuum of individuals, G, with density fG. In addition to choosing an
action, each individual must join one of N ≥ 1 groups indexed by g = 1, ..., N . We allow
for group membership to be restricted based on observable behavior, a, but we assume that
there exists at least one group that can be joined by anyone independently of his action.
A group structure is a rule assigning types to groups. Let S : [XG, XG] → ∆, where ∆ is
the set of probability distributions over {1, ..., N}, denote a group structure. We say that
S is an equilibrium group structure if each individual weakly prefers his group to any other
29 For instance, in our model, the majority might prefer the status quo over FR even when FR is socially
optimal and, as it happens in reality, median income is below mean income. In contrast, this never occurs in
the case of sorting.
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group. Finally, let SG denote a structure where all individuals join a single group (the grand
coalition). The next result establishes that any equilibrium group structure is equivalent, in
terms of action provision, to a structure where all individuals join the grand coalition.
Proposition 8. For any PBE under a given equilibrium group structure S, there exists an
outcome equivalent PBE under SG.
Proof. See Appendix.
Equilibrium requires that an individual choosing either action must be indifferent be-
tween joining any group where that action is played by a positive measure of agents (other-
wise some agent would profit from joining a different group). However, for this to occur, the
equilibrium posterior must be – conditional on performing or not the action – independent
of group membership. This ensures that endogenous group membership provides no fur-
ther information beyond the information already conveyed through the action choice. The
result should be read as saying that, for group structure to have an effect on incentives,
either individuals must have further reasons beyond status for joining a particular group
or groups must screen members based on information beyond publicly observable behavior.
Notice however that, in both these cases, group structure is at least partially determined by
exogenous considerations.
8 Further considerations on peer pressure and signaling
The analysis of peer pressure through the lens of esteem concerns delivers some sharp pre-
dictions. Heterogeneous peer groups always provide stronger motivation than homogeneous
groups. Similarly, agents whose peer distribution is truncated (e.g. because of segregation
by ability) always experience weaker motivation. We also found that better peers boost or
reduce motivation depending on the share of agents providing the signal and on whether the
peer distribution is unimodal or not. In a similar fashion, conditional predictions can be
obtained by manipulating the skewness of the peer distribution.
Clearly enough, our theory relies on the implicit assumption that the audience has accu-
rate information about the true distribution of types in the group. An alternative interpre-
tation of the comparative statics presented above is that, rather than the actual distribution
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changing, agents who initially lack precise information about a group are provided with a
better estimate of the group distribution. For instance, if an agent overestimates the degree
of inequality, a government report releasing information about the actual income distribution
has analogous effects on his incentives as an actual contraction of the income distribution.30
This interpretation closely follows Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), who focus on the role of
policies involving the strategic release of information to agents in addition to or in place of
more traditional policies. Note however that, under this interpretation, there would be no
composition effect (since the actual distribution does not change) and changes in aggregate
provision would only reflect changes in incentives.
From a more theoretical viewpoint, our analysis helps to shed light on some, perhaps less
well understood, features of the honor-stigma model.
Esteem and positionality We have noted that the net gain in esteem from performing
the status enhancing action, Φ(p) in (7), depends on the share of agents who abstain in the
reference group, p. In other words, the net gain in esteem depends on the “relative position”
within the group assigned to those who perform the action. Consider then what happens if
we add a positive constant to the type x of each agent in the group, while keeping p fixed. So
long as p does not change, this would have no effect on the net esteem gain from performing.
Intuitively, the extra honor that can now be reaped through providing the signal is exactly
offset by the lower stigma associated with abstaining. Overall, this suggests that assuming
a concern for esteem is akin to introducing an element of positionality in the preferences.
Two issues then immediately arise: First, is this true only of uniform shifts or does it also
apply to other manipulations of the peer distribution? Second, is it possible to empirically
discriminate between the honor-stigma model and a model where agents directly care about
their perceived rank/position (rather than their perceived type)?
Perceived rank or perceived type? Consider the first question. The above remark
on positionality holds because a uniform shift of the distribution affects Φ(p) only through
p. The same is however not true if a shock affects other features of the distribution, like
dispersion or skewness, which determine the shape of the Lorenz curve. In these cases,
30Note that, in this case, agents with rational expectations would also learn from their own type, so that
beliefs would be heterogeneous across types. This implies that any strengthening or weakening of incentives
may differ from type to type.
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signaling incentives will change even as we keep the share of abstainers constant. Intuitively,
suppose that a period of economic growth increases the average income of the top 10%
while the average income of the rest stagnates. In a perceived type model, like the present
one, the incentive to signal that one is in the top 10% becomes stronger. If instead agents
only care about perceived rank, being in the top 10% has the same value independently of
how unequal society is. In other words, in perceived type models, identical individuals with
the same perceived rank but in groups with distributions of different shape will typically
experience different degrees of peer pressure.
We can go further and ask how the model predictions would change if image concerns
were based on perceived rank rather than on type.31 To fix ideas, consider a model where net
esteem is given by E[F (X)|X > x]−E(F (X)|X < x], with the cumulative F (x) measuring
a type x agent’s (unobservable) rank. It is easy to verify that, in this case, net esteem is
always constant with respect to the shape of F .32 As a result, changes in the shape of the
distribution would not affect esteem incentives. This suggests that, in a rank based model,
a mean preserving spread would only have a composition effect. When the data allow to
control for the agent’s type (for instance by using a “within subjects” approach), the presence
of an incentive effect would thus be sufficient to discriminate between the two models. If, on
the other hand, only aggregate provision were observable, one would need to look for cases
where the composition effect and the incentive effect go in opposite directions (e.g. when
the marginal type is in the left tail). This could in principle provide an indirect way to
qualitatively assess the merits of the two approaches.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Points a) and b) are established in Jewitt (2004). We now prove c) using
an argument mirroring the one provided by Harbaugh and Rasmussen (2014). Let m+k (x)
and m−k (x) denote the k-th derivatives of m
+(x) = E(X|X > x) and m−(x) = E(X|X < x),
respectively. [Since the peer group is fixed, we omit the g argument.] We first need to
31We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting what follows.
32For any continuous CDF, F , the random variable y ≡ F (x) is always uniformly distributed in [0, 1]
independently of the shape of F .
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establish that, for f U-shaped, limx→X m−1 (x) = limx→X = 1/2. Note that,
m+1 (x) =
f(x)
1− F (x) [m
+(x)− x], m−1 (x) =
f(x)
F (x)
[x−m−(x)] (11)
Consider the limit for m−1 first. Using l’Hoˆpital,
lim
x→X
m−1 (x) = lim
x→X
f(x)
∫ x
X F (s)ds
F (x)2
= lim
x→X
f ′(x)
∫ x
X F (s)ds+ f(x)F (x)
2F (x)f(x)
=
1
2
+ lim
x→X
f ′′(x)
∫ x
X F (s)ds+ f
′(x)F (x)
2F (x)f ′(x) + 2f(x)2
=
1
2
(12)
where the last equality comes from the fact that, since f is U-shaped, f(X) > 0. A symmetric
argument establishes that the right limit of m+1 is also 1/2.
In order to show that φ is quasi-concave, we need to show that m+2 (x)−m−2 (x) ≤ 0 for
all x such that m+1 (x)−m−1 (x) = 0. Note that
m+2 (x) =
f ′(x)m+1 (x)
f(x)
+
f(x)
1− F (x) [2m
+
1 (x)− 1],
m−2 (x) =
f ′(x)m−1 (x)
f(x)
+
f(x)
F (x)
[1− 2m−1 (x)] (13)
Consider first any x such that m+1 (x) = m
−
1 (x) ≤ 1/2. Then m+2 (x) − m−2 (x) ≤ 0 as
required. Consider now any x such that m+1 (x) = m
−
1 (x) > 1/2. If x is smaller than the
anti-mode, then f must be decreasing. Given m−1 (x) > 1/2 and f
′(x) ≤ 0, then m−2 (x) < 0
from (13). However, since limx→X m−1 (x) = 1/2, m
−
2 (x) < 0 implies m
−
1 (x) ≤ 1/2, so that
we obtain a contradiction. Symmetrically, consider any x to the right of the anti-mode, so
that f is increasing. Then, m+1 (x) > 1/2 and f
′(x) ≥ 0 imply m+2 (x) > 0. However, we
know that limx→X m
+
1 (x) = 1/2, so that we obtain a contradiction. This implies that there
is no x such that m+1 (x) = m
−
1 (x) > 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 2 We provide the proof for the unimodal case, the U-shaped case being
perfectly symmetric. From Lemma 1, φ(x) cannot have a (strict) interior maximum. [Again,
since the peer group is fixed, we omit the g subscript.] It follows that there exists some xmin
such that φ(x) is weakly decreasing to the left of xmin and weakly increasing to the right.
[If φ(x) is monotonic in the support, take xmin = arg minx∈{X,X} φ(x).] We must rule out
ranges of values for x where φ(x) is constant. Notice now that
d
dx
φ(x) =
f(x)
1− F (x) [m
+(x)− x]− f(x)
F (x)
[x−m−(x)] (14)
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Hence, φ(x) is increasing (decreasing) whenever
φ(x) > (<)
x−m−(x)
F (x)
(15)
Suppose now that there exists an interval (x′, x′′) such that φ(x) is constant for all x ∈
(x′, x′′). This implies that (15) holds with equality for all x ∈ (x′, x′′). However, since
φ(x) is constant in this interval, the RHS of (15) must also be constant for all x ∈ (x′, x′′).
Otherwise, (15) cannot hold with equality for all x ∈ (x′, x′′). Notice that
d
dx
(
x−m−(x)
F (x)
)
= 0⇒ x−m
−(x)
F (x)
=
1
2f(x)
(16)
for all x ∈ (x′, x′′). But this in turn implies that, for all x ∈ (x′, x′′),
φ(x) =
1
2f(x)
(17)
However, f(x) is always strictly increasing or decreasing (except exactly at the mode), which
contradicts the claim that φ(x) is constant within any interval of positive measure. Hence,
φ(x) must be strictly decreasing to the left of xmin and strictly increasing to the right. [Notice
that this also rules out the uniform case where φ(x) is always constant.] We now show that
the minimum must coincide with the mode for f symmetric. Let Z = X − θ. Notice that,
from symmetry,
m+(x) = θ + E(Z|Z > x− θ) = θ + E(−Z|Z < θ − x) =
2θ − E(X|X < 2θ − x) = 2θ −m−(2θ − x) (18)
As a result, φ(x) = φ(2θ − x). However, this implies that if x 6= θ minimizes φ, then also
2θ−x minimizes φ, which contradicts the previous result of a unique minimum. Hence, φ(x)
is only minimized for x = θ. Finally, a symmetric argument can be made for the U-shaped
case.
Proof of Proposition 1 Since fg and fg′ differ only in the mean and have exactly one
change in monotonicity, φg and φg′ can cross at most once. If the densities are symmetric and
unimodal, then φg and φg′ have their minima at θg and θg′ , respectively, and must cross once.
The crossing point must thus be in the interval (θg, θg′). The same argument (using maxima
instead of minima) applies to symmetric U-shaped densities. Consider then any shift in
densities such that φg and φg′ cross and let xˆ be the unique crossing point. In the unimodal
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case we will thus have φg (x) > φg′ (x) for x > xˆ and φg (x) < φg′ (x) for x < xˆ. The opposite
applies to the U-shaped case. Evidently, from Assumption 1, the cutoffs of both groups must
lie on the same side of xˆ, so that (i) must hold. Results (ii) and (iii) then follow from the
fact that the RHS of (3), −v(x), is strictly decreasing. Consider now the case where φg and
φg′ never cross. Since Xg > Xg′ , this can only happen if φg(Xg) = φg′(Xg′) 6= φg(Xg) =
φg′(Xg′). Suppose first that φg(Xg) = φg′(Xg′) > φg(Xg) = φg′(Xg′). Then, given no
crossings, φg must necessarily lie below φg′ , i.e. φg(x) < φg′(x) for all x ∈ [Xg′ , Xg]. Since the
RHS of (3) is strictly decreasing, then x∗g′ < x
∗
g follows. On the other hand, φg(Xg) = θg−Xg
and φg(Xg) = Xg − θg, so that φg(Xg) > φg(Xg) ⇒ θg > (Xg + Xg)/2. Symmetrically,
suppose that φg(Xg) = φg′(Xg′) < φg(Xg) = φg′(Xg′) (so that θg < (Xg + Xg)/2). Then,
again, we have φg(x) > φg′(x) for all x, so that x
∗
g < x
∗
g′ .
Proof of Proposition 2 For left truncations, this reduces to showing that, for all x ∈
(k,Xg), φg(x)− φg′(x) > 0. Note that
φg(x)− φg′(x) = E(X|X > x)− E(X|X < x)− [E(X|X > x)− E(X|X ∈ (k, x))]
= E(X|X ∈ (k, x))− E(X|X ∈ (Xg, x)) > 0 (19)
For right truncations, we have instead,
φg(x)− φg′(x) = E(X|X > x)− E(X|X < x)− [E(X|X ∈ (x, k))− E(X|X < x]
= E(X|X ∈ (x,Xg))− E(X|X ∈ (x, k)) > 0. (20)
for all x ∈ (Xg, k). Consider now a left censoring. This involves reassigning to point k all
the probability mass to the left of k. For all x ∈ (k,Xg),
φg(x)− φg′(x) =
E(X|X > x)− E(X|X < x)−
[
E(X|X > x)− F (k)
F (x)
k − F (x)− F (k)
F (x)
E(X|X ∈ (k, x))
]
=
F (k)
F (x)
[k − E(X|X ∈ (Xg, k)) > 0
(21)
An analogous result is obtained in the symmetric case of right censoring. The proof is then
concluded by noticing that the RHS of (3) is decreasing in the cutoff.
Proof of Lemma 4 We know that fg−fg′ crosses zero at most three times. Hence, Fg−Fg′
has at most three changes in monotonicity. Let x ≡ min{Xg, Xg′} and x ≡ max{Xg, Xg′}.
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Clearly enough, Fg(x)− Fg′(x) = Fg(x)− Fg′(x) = 0. Hence, the difference Fg − Fg′ crosses
zero at most twice for x ∈ (x, x). Since fg−fg′ must be negative for x small enough, Fg−Fg′
must be initially negative. This implies that also the difference in the quantile functions
F−1g − F−1g′ must cross zero at most twice, and must be initially positive. Integrating again,
we obtain that the difference in the Lorenz curves Lg(p) − Lg′(p) changes monotonicity at
most twice. However, notice that Lg(0) − Lg′(0) = 0 and, since the two distributions have
the same mean, Lg(1) − Lg′(1) = 0. Hence, once again, the difference Lg(p) − Lg′(p) must
cross zero at most once, and must be initially positive.
Proof of Lemma 5 We know from Lemma 4 that either one distribution is second order
stochastically dominated or the Lorenz curves must cross exactly once, with Lg(p) initially
above Lg′(p). Hence, in the latter case, there must exist pˆ such that Lg(p) > Lg′(p) for all
p < pˆ and Lg(p) < Lg′(p) otherwise. From (7), this implies that Φg(p) > Φg′(p) for all p < pˆ
and Φg(p) < Φg′(p) for all p > pˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4 Consider then the case where neither distribution is second order
dominated. Then, from Lemma 3, there exists pˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that Φg(p) < Φg′(p) for all
p < pˆ and Φg(p) > Φg′(p) for all p > pˆ. Let xˆg ≡ F−1g (pˆ) and xˆg′ ≡ F−1g′ (pˆ). Clearly
enough, φg(x) < φg′(x) for all x < min{xˆg, xˆg′}. Since v(x) is increasing, if the proportion
of abstainers p is less than pˆ in both groups, it must be that x∗g > x∗g′ . The reverse clearly
happens if x > max{xˆg, xˆg′}, so that p > pˆ in both groups.
Proof of Proposition 5 If fg and fg′ cross twice, then the CDFs Fg and Fg′ cross only
once in the same interval. Hence, there exists xˆ ∈ (Xg′ , Xg′) such that Fg(xˆ) = Fg′(xˆ).
This obviously implies that the quantile functions also cross once at pˆ ≡ Fg(xˆ) = Fg′(xˆ).
From second order dominance, it must be that Fg(x) crosses Fg′(x) initially from above.
Hence, Fg(x) < Fg′(x) for all x > xˆ ⇔ p > pˆ. Since x∗g′ > x∗g from Proposition 3, then,
if x∗g ≥ xˆ, Fg′(x∗g′) > Fg(x∗g), which in turn implies 1 − Fg′(x∗g′) < 1 − Fg(x∗g). In contrast,
p ≤ pˆ⇔ x ≤ xˆ⇔ Fg(x) ≥ Fg′(x). Hence, whether group g′ or g has more provision depends
on how much larger x∗g′ is relative to x
∗
g. In the limit, as v(x) approaches a vertical line, then
x∗g′ → x∗g, which implies 1− Fg′(x∗g′) > 1− Fg(x∗g).
Proof of Proposition 6 Equilibrium requires φx(x
∗) = −v(x∗) or, for z∗ ≡ (x∗ − θ)/σ,
φx(θ + σz
∗) ≡ −v(θ + σz∗) (22)
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Note that,
φx(x
∗) = E[x|x > x∗]− E[x|x < x∗] = σ (E[z|z > z∗]− E[z|z < z∗]) ≡ σφz(z∗), (23)
and that, different from φx(x
∗), φz(z∗) depends on σ only through the cutoff. Equation (22)
thus becomes
σφz(z
∗) ≡ −v(θ + σz∗) (24)
Differentiating both sides of the identity with respect to σ, we obtain
dz∗
dσ
= − v
′(θ + σz∗)z∗ + φz(z∗)
σ(v′(θ + σz∗) + φ′z(z∗))
(25)
Note that the denominator is always positive in any stable equilibrium (this is because −v(x)
must cross φ(x) from above, so that −v′ < φ′ – whenever −v(x) crosses from below, the fixed
point is knife edge). Since v′ > 0, the term v′z∗+φz is also positive for all z∗ ≥ 0 (i.e. x∗ ≥ θ).
Consider first v(θ) < 0. We want to establish conditions under which dz∗/dσ is negative.
This is clearly the case when z∗ ≥ 0. Assume then z∗ < 0 (or x∗ < θ). Using the equilibrium
identity (24) to replace φz(z
∗), the term v′z∗ + φz has the same sign as
v′(θ + σz∗)σz∗ − v(θ + σz∗) (26)
or, equivalently,
v′(x∗)(x∗ − θ)− v(x∗) (27)
which is equal to
[v(θ)− v(x∗)− (v′(x∗)θ − v′(x∗)x∗)]− v(θ) (28)
Note that, given v(.) increasing, the term in brackets is non-negative (non-positive) for all
x∗ < θ when v(.) is weakly convex (concave). Given v(θ) < 0, there exists  > 0 such that
if v′′(x) > − for all x, expression (28) is positive, which implies dz∗/dσ < 0. Consider now
v(θ) > 0. Clearly, there exists  > 0 such that, if v′′(x) <  for all x, expression (28) is
negative for all x∗ < θ. Moreover, given v(θ) > 0, all types x ≥ θ strictly prefer to provide
the signal, so that, necessarily, x∗ < θ (z∗ < 0). This implies dz∗/dσ > 0. Consider then σ′
and σ′′ > σ′. Denoting with H the CDF of the standardized variable z, it follows that, if
v(θ) < 0 and v′′(x) > − for all x, Fσ′(x∗(σ′)) = H(z∗(σ′)) > H(z∗(σ′′)) = Fσ′′(x∗(σ′′)), so
that aggregate provision 1− Fσ(x∗) is larger when σ = σ′′. The reverse applies when v(.) is
not too convex and v(θ) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 8 We give the proof for PBE where, for each action a ∈ {0, 1}, there
exists at least one group where a is played by a positive measure of agents, but the argument
trivially extends to PBE where the same action is played in all groups. Fix an equilibrium
group structure S. Given S, there must exist, for all a ∈ {0, 1} at least one group ga with a
positive fraction of members choosing action a. Moreover, in any equilibrium, an individual
choosing a must be indifferent between joining ga and any other group with a positive fraction
of members who choose a (and must weakly prefer these groups to any other group). This
implies that all type x individuals choose a = 1 iff E(x|a = 1, g1)− E(x|a = 0, g0) ≥ −v(x)
irrespectively of their group membership. Hence, given monotonicity of v, there exists a xˆ
such that a = 1⇔ x ≥ xˆ irrespectively of group membership. Let ya(g) denote the measure
of agents choosing action a which is in group g. From the law of iterated expectations∑N
g=1 y1(g)E(x|a = 1, g) = EG(x|x ≥ xˆ) and
∑N
g=1 y0(g)E(x|a = 0, g) = EG(x|x < xˆ)
where the G subscript is used to stress that the expectation is taken under the aggregate
density fG. However, since E(x|a, g) = E(x|a, ga) for all groups such that ya(g) > 0,
E(x|a = 0, g0) = EG(x|x < xˆ) and E(x|a = 1, g1) = EG(x|x ≥ xˆ) follow. Equilibrium
then implies that xˆ must satisfy φG(xˆ) = −v(xˆ). This in turn implies that xˆ must be an
equilibrium cutoff under SG.
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